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Abstract 
 
 This paper adds maternal employment and income to a traditional intergenerational 
income elasticity model to measure mothers’ effects on transmission of economic status from 
parents to children.  Assuming that mothers have a specific role in perpetuating the human 
capital and income-generating behavior of a family, I examine the intergenerational transmission 
of economic status using regression analysis in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on 
individuals born between 1950 and 1974.  My results suggest that while the income of fathers is 
very important in accounting for sons’ and daughters’ future outcomes, the amount of time 
parents stay at home or are unemployed also affects intergenerational transmission of economic 
status for daughters.  Specifically, daughters experience a positive role model effect on their 
future income if mothers are employed during their childhood while fathers’ time spent 
employed negatively impacts daughter’s income.  The interaction model testing maternal 
employment on transmission of income from father to daughter does have tentative positive 
results.  When examining economic mobility for cohorts, I find that there are no significant 
changes in mobility for sons or daughters. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 Intergenerational income transmission literature largely focuses on the father-to-son 
income relationship to describe economic mobility due to traditional gender roles and availability 
of data.  These measurements reflect the permanence of economic status through generations and 
its implications for inequality and mobility.  Social scientists view low intergenerational income 
correlations as an indicator of greater opportunity to move out of the economic situation people 
were born into.   
There is a growing body of intergenerational income elasticity (IIE) literature that 
examines income correlations between mothers and children by using family income.  Between 
1975 and 2000, the labor force participation rate of mothers with children under the age of 18 
increased from 47 percent to 71 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics).  As women earn an 
increasing share of family income, it is appropriate to factor their income into intergenerational 
transfer of economic status but also the role of time spent with children.  I approach the role of 
mothers as an important part of the human capital transmission to children, and thus economic 
status of parents.  In the human capital model of Becker and Tomes (1986) the heritability of 
endowments from parents and propensity to invest in children’s human capital (subject to capital 
constraints) are key determinants of the intergenerational income coefficient.  Thus, the time 
spent with children by parents should affect the heritability of endowments and other income-
generating attributes.  Additionally, since mothers are often selected by assortative mating,
1
 their 
relationships with children may have an important time component to transmit the economic 
                                                        
1
 Non-random matching in the marriage market; individuals having more traits in common with 
their mates than in random mating. 
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status of the entire family.  If the surge in maternal employment has affected the amount of time 
spent in human capital transmission, there may be effects on IIE between fathers and children.   
This paper addresses the role of parental income as well as the amount of time each 
parent spent employed in determining a child’s future economic status. This is a new approach to 
improve upon the traditional regression of son’s long run income on father’s long run income to 
understand IIE.   
In this paper, I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 
2009.  The PSID is the only pertinent longitudinal dataset with consistent measures of income 
that follows children from the original sample as they establish their households, allowing 
researchers to link parents to their children as adults. 
I average parental incomes over five years from age 30 to 35 to eliminate noisy measures 
of long-run economic status.  I do the same for sons and daughters in order to restrict the effects 
of income volatility during their 20s and 30s and minimize measurement error in the dependent 
variable, although this does diminish the sample size.  To proxy the amount of time parents 
spend at work and thus away from children, I create a percentage of years each parent is 
employed over the years when their child was 1 to 15.  An important consideration in using this 
proxy is that a parent employed for longer periods of time is more likely to have a higher lifetime 
permanent income.  These proxies may capture this effect, making the intergenerational income 
coefficient hard to interpret as a pure IIE.  However, I use this non-exact proxy because I am not 
interested in the exact process of intergenerational income transmission but rather the elasticity, 
and using a more direct measure of time spent with children would need many more controls, 
which would not allow use of the IIE model. 
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I find that daughters are significantly impacted by the amount of time a parent spent 
employed during their childhood.  Paternal employment time negatively impacts the future 
income of the daughter but the positive impact that paternal income brings far outweighs that 
effect, considering that most fathers were employed during the entire childhood.  Daughters 
experience a positive effect of maternal employment during their childhood, which is likely a 
result of a female working role model.   
Next, I consider interaction effects between maternal employment status and paternal 
income based on the theory that mother’s time spent away from home impacts the human capital 
transmission, which would be reflected through income transmission.  I do the same with father’s 
time spent away from home and maternal income for symmetry and do not find significant 
interaction effects for sons.  For daughters, both interaction effects are positive, indicating if one 
parent is employed during the entirety of daughter’s childhood, that daughter has increased IIE 
with the opposite parent.  It does not seem that maternal employment has decreased the 
intergenerational persistence of income between father and children.  Although these results are 
subject to change due to the variable definition of parental employment, daughters’ IIE is 
impacted by fluctuations in parental time and warrants further research. 
I also look for trends in intergenerational income mobility and do not find a robust 
change in intergenerational income elasticity with fathers for sons or daughters.  Though initial 
results are significant, they are subject to change when changing the cohort definition.  This is 
consistent with other trend studies (Hertz 2007, Lee and Solon 2009).  The trends are also not 
affected by the inclusion of maternal income and parental employment proxies.  
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II.  Literature Review and Mechanism 
 
Early studies found relatively small intergenerational income elasticities - typically less 
than 0.20 between father and son (Becker & Tomes, 1986; Behrman and Taubman, 1985).  Later 
papers by Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) use more years of income data to more 
accurately proxy for permanent income and account for sample homogeneity.  Estimates 
increased substantially to around 0.40, suggesting a substantially less mobile society than earlier 
indicated as 40 percent of son’s income is correlated with father’s income.  Recently, more 
studies recognizing the lack of maternal contribution include family income and other diverse 
earnings measurements instead of just father’s annual income as alternative measures of 
economic background.  One rare example is from Altonji and Dunn (1991) who find that the 
mother-offspring family income correlation is just as strong if not stronger than the correlation of 
father-offspring family income.  Little research focuses on the mother’s direct income correlation 
with offspring, even as most mothers with children under the age of 18 are employed.  
Daughter intergenerational income elasticity with fathers and mothers is always estimated 
using family income rather than individual income as the economic status of women still very 
much depends on their mating choices and husbands’ income (Chadwick and Solon 2002, 
Altonji and Dunn 1991).  In the past few decades, however, women were more likely to use their 
own occupation to improve their economic status (Kearney 2006).  This implies that parent-
daughter IIE estimates are much more important in the current situation. 
Solon (2004) develops a model of intergenerational mobility, which depends on the 
heritability of income-generating traits, investment in children’s human capital, the economic 
return to human capital, and the amount of public investment in child’s human capital.  This 
model builds upon the model developed by Becker and Tomes (1986) that claims the income 
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correlation between generations is based on heritability of endowments and the propensity of 
parents to invest in child’s human capital.  This paper examines whether the increase in working 
mothers has affected the heritability of income-generating traits or efficacy of human capital 
investment.  Due to the large increase in maternal labor force participation as well as maternal 
contribution to family income, changes in human capital transmission may have changed the 
traditional relationship between father and offspring wages.   
Women are traditionally the primary childcare providers in the family and therefore 
potentially function as important transmitters of human capital.  Altonji and Dunn (1991) find 
evidence of assortative mating in the high correlation of income between men and their in-laws, 
indicating that marriages tend to form based on common socioeconomic background and 
education levels.  Nakosteen and Zimmer (2001) use the PSID to find pre- and post-marriage 
positive assortative mating through unobserved earnings traits, observed in standardized 
residuals or individual fixed effects.  This shows that women have an important role in 
promoting the socioeconomic status of the entire family through human capital transmission, 
especially since there is also increasing educational assortative mating since the 1930s (Mare 
1991).  In light of the huge increase in maternal employment, mothers have possibly decreased 
the time spent with children and thereby decreased human capital transmission (if it is positively 
associated with maternal childcare time) with the use of substitute childcare (Greenstein, 1993).  
On the other hand, the increase in income brought in by the family allows parents to provide 
financial resources to increase the human capital acquisition of children through opportunities 
such as private tutoring and better schooling (Cornelissen et al., 2008; Becker and Tomes, 1986).  
This paper attempts to clarify the effect of maternal employment on parental transmission of 
economic status to children. 
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Research on the effect of maternal employment on offspring development and well-being 
has varied results.  Reviews of this body of work indicate that there are no clear negative or 
positive effects (Hoffman, 1989).  Greenstein (1993) suggests three mechanisms through which 
maternal employment may impact offspring development: substitute forms of childcare, amount 
of time the mother is away from the child, and economic consequences (increase in income).  
There are no long run studies on the impacts of maternal employment on child economic 
outcomes, but the studies that describe maternal employment effects on academic outcomes or 
cognitive development of children may be able to proxy for these results.  These studies, 
including Greenstein (1995), focus mostly on early childhood cognitive skills and maternal 
employment during infancy. 
The amount of time working mothers are able to spend with children may impact 
children’s future outcomes.  Most of the background theory of human capital transmission 
through maternal time use is outlined in Michael (1973) and Becker (1975).  According to 
Michael, the amount of childcare time and level of child quality desired increases with parental 
financial resources. Hill and Stafford (1980) and Leibowitz (1974a) find empirical support for 
this theory.  Becker claims that children will decide on the optimal investment in schooling, 
based in part on their parents’ choices in investment in child quality.  Datcher-Loury (1988) and 
Bianchi and Robinson (1997) find supporting evidence that maternal childcare time does 
significantly increase the child’s years of schooling and cognitive development, respectively.   
Obviously, mothers that enter the workforce have less time to personally dedicate to 
household production.  Datcher-Loury (1988) finds that higher wages or opportunity cost of 
home time reduces maternal childcare time.  Some argue that the effect of labor market 
participation on time with children is overestimated (Bianchi 2000).  Bryant and Zick (1996) try 
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to account for the fact that previous studies of maternal childcare time exclude any shared time 
that is not used in direct childcare, which only includes activities such as reading with the child 
or bathing the child.  This definition is very limiting when trying to discern human capital 
transmission; time spent in other household activities such as playing with the child or doing 
housework with the child can develop mental and physical skills and instill social values that 
may improve future socioeconomic outcomes.  They find that an increase in mother’s market 
work will have a significantly negative impact only on solitary housework and solitary leisure 
time, while shared time with children stays fairly constant. 
Additionally, once mothers enter the labor market, the actual childcare time may not be 
diminished significantly: according to Bianchi (2000) and Sandberg and Hofferth (2005) there is 
surprising continuity in children’s time with parents.  Bianchi attributes this to an increase in 
father-child interaction time as well as changes in children’s lives, which alters the time and 
investment children need from parents.  According to Coverman and Sheley (1986), men’s 
childcare time in fact does not increase as a result of wife’s employment.  If this is the case, then 
there is ambiguity in whether actual childcare time is decreasing substantially, thereby impacting 
human capital transmission. 
Time use, however, only plays one part in the role of human capital transmission.  The 
studies that focus on estimating the relationship between various proxies for parental time inputs 
and child’s schooling achievements find mixed results. Leibowitz (1974b) finds more parental 
instructional activities are correlated with higher sons’ IQ scores but not with years of schooling.  
Etaugh (1984) finds no effects of maternal employment on the educational progress of children, 
even if maternal childcare time was diminished.  In this paper, I do not specifically examine time 
effects on income-generating ability because I am more interested in how much IIE is changed 
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by time changes.  Thus, I use a proxy for time spent away from children created from parental 
employment information. 
Studies of time trends in intergenerational income mobility are largely inconclusive.  
Using the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), Mayer and Lopoo (2005) show that 
elasticity decreased for sons born from 1954 to 1963.  Fertig (2003) also finds that father-son 
elasticity has decreased but mother-son income elasticity has stagnated over time.  She finds 
unclear results for mother-daughter and father-daughter income elasticity over time and 
concludes no change.  Two other studies find no significant changes in intergenerational mobility 
over time between (Lee and Solon, 2009; Hertz, 2007). Only Fertig (2003) estimates the trend of 
intergenerational correlation between mothers and offspring, however she uses data from a 
relatively short time period of parental cohorts from 1968 to 1976.  Hansen (2010) analyzes 
economic mobility among Norwegian birth cohorts based on father’s economic position and joint 
income of the mother and father.  She finds that mobility is lower than previously thought when 
using more appropriate income measurements and only increases over time when the definition 
of income is limited to father’s earnings.   
This paper examines how time and income of parents affect child economic outcomes.  
This may have implications for the trends in intergenerational income mobility if time with child 
does affect income correlation with child. 
 
 
III. Data 
 
 I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) by the University of Michigan, which 
includes consistent yearly labor income data since 1968 for almost 5,000 U.S. families until 1997 
and biennially since then.  As a longitudinal study, it also follows children from the original 
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sample through their adult lives and even after they form their own households.  The income 
measurement and other observable characteristics of individuals have remained fairly consistent 
since the beginning of the survey.  I adjust the income measurements using the CPI-U-X1 to 
2007 dollars. 
 Each observation in the dataset is a child linked to his or her parents’ information.  All 
children are born between 1950 and 1974.  The information of adoptive parents is included 
because I am not interested in genetic endowments but rather the transmission of income-
generating traits and the longevity of socioeconomic condition over generations.  As discussed in 
Solon (1992), estimation of IIE needs a heterogeneous random sample and accurate proxies of 
long-run economic status in order to correct downward biases in estimated correlations.  When 
measuring incomes of parents, I average income over the ages 30 to 34 to eliminate measurement 
error.  I also require up to a five-year average of child earnings (over the same ages) in order to 
correct for any volatility as in Fertig (2003) due to measurement error in the dependent variable.  
Left-side measurement error does cause bias in OLS estimation because of heterogeneous 
income growth rates of individuals over their life cycles.  This causes the income gap earlier in 
the lifecycle to understate the lifetime gap and later in the lifecycle to overstate the gap if 
individuals have steeper income growth trajectories (Reville 1995, Haider and Solon 2006, Lee 
and Solon 2009).   
I chose this period of years because they are prime-income generating years to proxy 
present value of lifetime income, although the availability of data diminishes my sample size in 
comparison to all other studies including Chadwick and Solon (2002) and Mayer and Lopoo 
(2005), who instead just use child income at age 25 and 30 respectively.  According to Haider 
and Solon (2006), the association between earnings at a certain age and lifetime earnings reaches 
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1 at about age 32.  I chose to average income from age 30 to 34 in order to best approximate this 
long run economic status while smoothing out any transitory volatility.  I believe my income 
restrictions will produce more realistic proxies for economic status and permanent income, 
especially for women.   
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the sample includes 474 observations for sons and 464 for 
daughters.  Income averages are calculated without years of unemployment (income of zero) for 
all individuals consistent with the usual practice in IIE literature of excluding unemployment 
years. This permits a better understanding of what constitutes long-run economic status and its 
effects on intergenerational economic transmission.  This does raise the question whether the 
zero incomes imply a certain characteristic for economic status and whether this income 
characteristic is inherited; thus, I include them as a separate sample for the econometric 
framework in section VI.  Taking the natural log of all incomes in order to generate an elasticity 
pre-selects daughters that have a positive income between the ages of 30 to 35 and drops all 
unemployed daughters.  This does not allow discussion of daughters’ individual economic status 
if they do not earn income, but these individuals would only add 48 to the sample size for 
daughters.  This specification of examining daughters with their own individual positive income 
is rarely analyzed, as female income is usually enveloped in a family income variable to examine 
their economic success after the marriage market. 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Sons 
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. Minimum Maximum Count 
Son's Income   $45,326.60   $34,810.91   $245.00   $350,675.00  474 
Father's Income  $41,176.67   $18,433.56   $3,860.00   $133,794.00  474 
Mother's Income  $12,636.77   $10,886.85   $120.00   $54,590.00  474 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Daughters 
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. Minimum Maximum Count 
Daughter's Income  $28,565.18   $25,560.53   $130.00   $234,460.00  464 
Father's Income  $41,097.39   $23,429.18   $965.00   $213,450.00  464 
Mother's Income  $12,974.37   $11,240.46   $90.00   $63,080.00  464 
 
 In order to measure the amount of time spent with children, I assume that if parents are 
not working, they are investing time in their children.  Thus, I first create a dummy variable for 
each year representing if the parent was employed that year.  The average of these dummy 
variables over the years when the child was 1 to 15 is effectively a percentage of the time when 
the parent was employed during the offspring’s childhood.  I call these variables maternal and 
paternal employment averages.  Precise time use surveys are not available for most of the PSID 
sample and there are limitations regarding what kind of activities qualify as childcare and human 
capital transmitting activities.  Since I am not detailing the channels through which human 
capital is transmitted, choosing the more general proxy of percentage of years employed during 
offspring’s childhood will be more appropriate to preserve a pure intergenerational income 
elasticity.  Tables 3 and 4 display the descriptive statistics for these variables across each five-
year birth cohort in the sample. 
TABLE 3. Paternal Employment Averages when Child Age 1-15 
Birth 
Cohort 5th Perc. 
25th 
Perc. Median 
75th 
Perc. 
95th 
Perc. Mean 
1950-54 1 1 1 1 1 0.9668508 
1955-59 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.9655057 
1960-64 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.9548366 
1965-69 0.6666667 1 1 1 1 0.9576873 
1970-74 0.8666667 1 1 1 1 0.9740888 
Total 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.9640929 
 
 
 
Wang 
 
14 
TABLE 4. Maternal Employment Averages when Child Age 1-15 
Birth 
Cohort 5th Perc. 
25th 
Perc. Median 
75th 
Perc. 
95th 
Perc. Mean 
1950-54 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.4889503 
1955-59 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.4833432 
1960-64 0 0.25 0.6 0.9166667 1 0.5653611 
1965-69 0 0.3333333 0.6428571 0.8666667 1 0.5980479 
1970-74 0.0666667 0.4615385 0.7333333 0.9333333 1 0.6660592 
Total 0 0.2583333 0.6666667 0.9333333 1 0.5796715 
 
IV.  Methodology 
For all regressions, I control for five-year birth cohorts from 1950 to 1974 so that 
different cohort characteristics do not influence results.  I also cluster standard errors by cohort, 
which allows the error term to be correlated across members of the same cohort. 
To establish baseline estimates for intergenerational income elasticity, I will run the 
standard regression found in most literature for all children born from 1950 to 1974 (the entire 
sample).  This regresses log long-run offspring income (yi) on log long run father’s income (yfi), 
assuming that the population variance in labor income is the same for both generations: 
ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + εi        (1) 
The β measures the extent to which the child’s economic outcome is correlated with the 
parent’s economic status.  I perform this for father-son pairs and father-daughter pairs.  After 
establishing estimates for traditional intergenerational income elasticity, I adjust this baseline 
regression equation to include other variables of interest in the model that claims child outcomes 
depend on a combination of parental income and time spent with children to transmit income-
generating traits.  This includes maternal income (ymi) and the proxy variables for time spent 
with children where patemp represents father’s employment average and matemp is mother’s 
employment average.  Equation (2) explains the direct effects of maternal employment through 
direct income effects as well as through the maternal employment average. 
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ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + β2ln (ymi) + β3 matempi  + β4 patempi +  εi   (2) 
 In order to examine the possible effects of maternal employment on traditional income 
transmission from father to children, I use an interaction model detailed in equation (3), which 
includes the interaction term between long run father’s income and the maternal employment 
average.  Equation (4) includes an interaction term between mother’s income and the paternal 
employment average, while equation (5) includes both interaction terms.  These models explain 
any indirect effects that maternal employment may have on intergenerational income 
transmission through father’s income or conversely, how paternal employment might impact 
offspring correlation with mother’s income. 
ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + β2ln (ymi) + β3 matempi  + β4 patempi + β5matempi*ln (yfi) +  εi (3) 
ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + β2ln (ymi) + β3 matempi  + β4 patempi + β5patempi*ln (ymi) +  εi (4) 
ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + β2ln (ymi) + β3 matempi  + β4 patempi + β4matempi*ln (yfi) + β5patempi*ln 
(ymi) +  εi           (5) 
So far, the analysis focuses on the whole birth cohort from 1950 to 1974.  In order to find 
consequences for measurements of intergenerational mobility, I construct 5 five-year birth 
cohorts of children born in 1950-1954, 1955-1959, 1960-1964, 1965-1969 and 1970-1974.  First, 
I create a continuous cohort variable, which labels each cohort as 1 to 5.  Interacting this variable 
with father’s income will allow me to fit a trend to this data.  I also interact cohort indicator 
variables with other significant variables in the expanded model to see if these relationships with 
offspring income change over time. 
ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + β2ln (ymi) + β3 matempi  + β4 patempi + β5 CohortIndicatori +  
β6ln (yfi)* CohortIndicatori  + εi        (6)
 Additionally, I create cohort indicators for each cohort.  The significance of these cohort 
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dummy variables provides an understanding of how the economic outcomes of each cohort fared 
compared to the other cohorts.  By interacting these dummy variables with the paternal income, 
the effect of cohorts on traditional income correlation with fathers will become apparent.   
ln(yi) = β1ln (yfi) + β2ln (ymi) + β3 matempi  + β4 patempi + β5 Cohort2i + β6 Cohort3i + β7 
Cohort4i + β8 Cohort5i + β9ln (yfi)* Cohort2i + β10ln (yfi)* Cohort3i + β11ln (yfi)* Cohort4i + 
β12ln (yfi)* Cohort5i  + εi         (7) 
 
V. Results 
 In section V.i., I present the accepted baseline estimates for intergenerational income 
elasticity for sons and daughters.  I also present results from the expanded model that includes 
maternal income and parental employment averages detailed in the methodology section.  
Section V.ii. displays the results from interaction models of equations (3), (4), and (5) for sons 
and daughters.  Section V.iii. presents the regression results for the two trend models I use in 
order to determine if intergenerational mobility has changed over time for the birth cohorts from 
1950 to 1974 and whether controlling for the additional variables affects these trends. 
 
V.i. Baseline and Expanded Model 
 Figure 1 presents results from equation (1) or the baseline estimates for father-offspring 
income elasticities, assuming the variance in incomes does not change over the two generations.  
The results show that about 0.37 of a son’s income and 0.26 of a daughter’s income will be 
correlated with that of the father.  The estimates for father-son elasticity are slightly lower than 
the generally accepted 0.40 using the PSID by Solon (1992) however this is attributed to the 
differing methods of estimating long run income.  The estimates for father-daughter elasticity are 
difficult to compare since the majority of related literature does not use daughter’s income as I 
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do, but rather compares daughter’s family income to father’s family income as a measure of 
intergenerational transmission of economic status.   
Figure 1. Baseline Estimates 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Son's 
Income 
Daughter's 
Income 
      
Father's Income 0.366*** 0.257** 
 
(0.0517) (0.0862) 
Cohort 1955-59 0.0785*** 0.00538 
 
(0.0130) (0.0624) 
Cohort 1960-64 0.180*** -0.175* 
 
(0.0115) (0.0694) 
Cohort 1965-69 0.125*** 0.152 
 
(0.0147) (0.0720) 
Cohort 1970-74 0.213*** 0.211** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0759) 
   Observations 474 464 
R-squared 0.081 0.061 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Next, I expand the traditional intergenerational income model to a model in which the 
dependent variable of child’s income is a function of parental income and time spent with 
children, along with other factors that I assume to be captured in the error term.  I proxy time 
spent with children with the parental employment averages which I detail in the data section.  
Figure 2 presents the effect of paternal income, maternal income, maternal employment during 
childhood, and paternal employment during childhood on sons and daughters.   
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Figure 2. Expanded Model 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
Son's 
Income 
Daughter's 
Income 
      
Father's Income 0.358*** 0.299** 
 
(0.056) (0.0903) 
Mother's Income 0.0222 -0.0492 
 
(0.0314) (0.0333) 
Average Paternal Employment  (APE) 0.147 -0.965*** 
 
(0.466) (0.155) 
Average Maternal Employment (AME) 0.0287 0.620** 
 
(0.107) (0.139) 
Cohort 1955-59 0.0636*** -0.248* 
 
(0.0132) (0.11) 
Cohort 1960-64 0.153*** -0.454** 
 
(0.0285) (0.121) 
Cohort 1965-69 0.0972** -0.104 
 
(0.0281) (0.119) 
Cohort 1970-74 0.179*** -0.05 
 
(0.0343) (0.126) 
   Observations 474 464 
R-squared 0.083 0.089 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The results of Figure 2 compared to those of Figure 1 describe the transmission of 
economic status for sons as one primarily through the channel of father’s income, arguing for a 
large income effect in human capital transmission.  This result aligns with previous theoretical 
support in Becker and Tomes (1986) for equation (1), or the intergenerational elasticity model.  
The consistent coefficient on father’s income from Figure 1 to Figure 2 means that the 
heritability of endowments and propensity to invest in children is not affected by maternal 
income nor by the employment status of parents during childhood.   
 The regression for daughter’s income in Figure 2 is much more interesting with 
significant coefficients on both average parental employment variables.  The correlation with 
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father’s income has increased but is still only significant at the 5% level.  I attribute this increase 
to the inclusion of the paternal employment average variable and its dampening effect on the 
transmission of economic status from father to daughter.  To accurately interpret the significant 
results from parental employment status during offspring’s childhood, we must account for the 
income effect from employment.  For example, since average paternal employment is a 
continuous variable from 0 to 1, if it changes from 0 to 1 then there is a negative ceteris paribus 
effect on daughter’s future income but there will be a large positive effect from the income 
generated from working for the entire period of daughter’s childhood.  Figure 3 uses the average 
incomes of daughter’s parents in the sample to calculate the net effect of paternal and maternal 
employment for daughters with those parental characteristics. 
Figure 3.  Parental Employment Effects for Daughters 
 
Paternal Employment 
10.46 (Average log(Father's Income)) 
x 0.299 (Daughter's Income Correlation) 
3.127 (Positive effect of father's income in log terms) 
-0.965 (Negative effect of Average Paternal Employment in log terms) 
+2.12 
 
  
 
Maternal Employment 
8.95 (Average log(Mother's Income) 
x -0.05 
§ 
(Daughter's Income Correlation) 
-0.45 (Negative/Insignificant effect of mother's income in log terms) 
+0.62 (Positive effect of Average Maternal Employment in log terms) 
+0.17 
 
 
§ = insignificant 
 
 
 Father’s employment during daughter’s childhood has a negative effect holding all else 
constant.  However for all daughters in the sample, the net effect of paternal employment is 
positive due to the large positive effect of father’s income.  Maternal employment is more 
difficult to interpret since daughter’s income correlation with mothers is insignificant from zero.  
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Taking the -0.05 correlation from Figure 2, mothers in the sample have a net positive effect on 
daughters’ future economic outcomes if they are employed during daughter’s childhood.  This 
positive effect of maternal employment status reflects a positive “role model” effect on 
daughters.  I conclude that for daughters in the future, it is more beneficial if mothers work more 
and fathers spend more time with daughters during childhood.   
 
V.ii.  Interaction Models 
 This section explores the possibility of an interaction effect between one parent’s 
employment status affecting the income transmission from the other parent to the child.  These 
models are based on the assumption that if one parent is working more the other parent stays at 
home more or that due to assortative mating, the transmission of family economic status depends 
on at least one of the parents attending to the child.  Thus the child’s income correlation with 
either parent has the potential to be impacted by the other parent’s employment status.  Mainly 
what I aim to find is the effect of mother’s employment status on the child’s future economic 
outcome indirectly.  If maternal employment status affects the intergenerational income 
correlation between child and father, this means that by working, mothers have changed the 
process of human capital transmission.  To balance this hypothesis, I also test the idea that 
father’s employment status affects mother’s income correlation with child.  Results from 
equations (3), (4), and (5) are displayed in Figures 4 and 5 for sons and daughters.  These results 
are compared to the direct effects of employment status from the expanded model to see if 
indirect effects are significant.   
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Figure 4. Son's Income: Expanded Model + Interaction Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
              
Father's Income 0.358*** 0.551*** 0.352*** 0.526*** 
 
(0.0560) (0.0732) (0.0586) (0.102) 
Mother's Income 0.0222 0.0232 0.338 0.244 
 
(0.0314) (0.0345) (0.552) (0.580) 
Average Paternal Employment  (APE) 0.147 0.112 3.077 2.164 
 
(0.466) (0.446) (5.370) (5.614) 
Average Maternal Employment (AME) 0.0287 2.884 0.0268 2.573 
 
(0.107) (1.929) (0.108) (2.199) 
AME * Father's Income 
 
-0.272 
 
-0.242 
  
(0.176) 
 
(0.200) 
APE * Mother's Income 
  
-0.321 -0.224 
   
(0.543) (0.572) 
Cohort 1955-59 0.0636*** 0.0808*** 0.0684** 0.0824*** 
 
(0.0132) (0.00530) (0.0159) (0.00662) 
Cohort 1960-64 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.164*** 0.160** 
 
(0.0285) (0.0298) (0.0344) (0.0367) 
Cohort 1965-69 0.0972** 0.0949** 0.107** 0.102** 
 
(0.0281) (0.0288) (0.0348) (0.0363) 
Cohort 1970-74 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.190*** 0.184** 
 
(0.0343) (0.0353) (0.0390) (0.0407) 
     Observations 474 474 474 474 
R-squared 0.083 0.086 0.084 0.086 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 Son’s income is still only significantly correlated with father’s income.  Neither mother’s 
income nor mother’s time devoted to the household significantly affects son’s future income. 
The hypothesis that maternal employment could affect son’s income through the channel of 
father’s income transmission is not justified.   
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Figure 5. Daughter's Income: Expanded Model + Interaction Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
          
Father's Income 0.299** 0.166* 0.313** 0.187* 
 
(0.0903) (0.0772) (0.0938) (0.0825) 
Mother's Income -0.0492 -0.0512 0.418** 0.345** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0347) (0.108) (0.121) 
Average Paternal Employment  (APE) -0.965*** -0.975*** 4.321** 3.642** 
 
(0.155) (0.161) (1.006) (1.119) 
Average Maternal Employment (AME) 0.620** -1.647* 0.616** -1.479 
 
(0.139) (0.729) (0.135) (0.717) 
AME * Father's Income 
 
0.219* 
 
0.202* 
  
(0.0805) 
 
(0.0787) 
APE * Mother's Income 
  
0.374** 0.297* 
   
(0.100) (0.113) 
Cohort 1955-59 -0.248* -0.263* -0.258* -0.271* 
 
(0.110) (0.107) (0.112) (0.109) 
Cohort 1960-64 -0.454** -0.475** 0.463** 0.481** 
 
(0.121) (0.119) (0.122) (0.120) 
Cohort 1965-69 -0.104 -0.125 -0.115 -0.132 
 
(0.119) (0.116) (0.120) (0.118) 
Cohort 1970-74 -0.0500 -0.0675 -0.0668 -0.0795 
 
(0.126) (0.121) (0.128) (0.125) 
     Observations 464 464 464 464 
R-squared 0.089 0.091 0.090 0.091 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 Again, daughters have far more interesting results.  In column (2), after controlling for 
maternal employment interaction with father’s income, the effect of father’s income increases to 
0.385 from 0.299 if the mother works the entire period of daughter’s childhood.  If the average 
maternal employment variable can be taken as a proxy for time spent away from child, then the 
implication is that mothers working may then increase paternal time with daughter, thereby 
increasing income correlation with the father.  On the other hand, if mothers are not employed at 
all during daughter’s childhood, the income correlation with fathers would fall to 0.166, which in 
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this case would be explained by the fact that maternal time with daughters is a very strong 
determinant in their income elasticity with parents.  In column (3), daughter’s income correlation 
with mother becomes substantially higher and significant (to 0.792) if the father is employed the 
duration of daughter’s childhood.  Column (4) includes both interaction effects, which means 
that if a parent is employed full-time, the daughter’s income correlation with the other parent will 
increase.  Thus, daughters are more sensitive to the time parents spend employed.   
One problem with these interaction effects is visible in columns (3) and (4) when after 
controlling for paternal employment interacted with maternal income, the effect of paternal 
employment switches signs and increases in magnitude by 5.286 for column (3) and 4.607 for 
column (4).  The large positive effects of paternal employment as well as its positive interaction 
effect could be a distortion from my choice for the average paternal employment variable.  Since 
the variable picks up an average percent of years employed over the period from when the 
daughter was 1 to 15, it is highly correlated with the father’s lifetime income (since people 
employed over longer periods of time usually earn more income).  Thus the inclusion of this 
variable may result in capturing the positive income effects of paternal employment in the other 
years of employment, which are not captured in the five-year long run proxy created for father’s 
income.   
I investigate this distortion by changing the parameters of the expanded model by 
separating the employment average into two variables.  The average parental employment 
variables from when the parent was 30 to 35 will control for the relationship between 
employment and income at the point in time when I measure income.  Then I include newly 
created average parental employment variables which average parental employment when the 
daughter was 1 to 5 in order to find the interaction between parental employment when the 
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daughter was a young age and her future income elasticity with both parents.  Figure 6 displays 
the results in columns 2 to 4.
2
 
Figure 6. Modified Expanded Model with Interaction Effects - Daughters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
              
Father's Income 0.335 0.286 0.347 0.295 
 
(0.124) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
Mother's Income -0.00664 -0.00836 -0.670 -0.725 
 
(0.0623) (0.0627) (0.691) (0.712) 
Average Paternal Employment - 30 to 35 -1.516 -1.527 -1.233 -1.222 
 
(0.856) (0.849) (1.002) (0.977) 
Average Maternal Employment - 30 to 35 -0.126 -0.121 -0.122 -0.116 
 
(0.247) (0.240) (0.252) (0.246) 
Average Paternal Employment - child 1 to 5 -0.749 -0.738 -6.708 -7.175 
 
(0.348) (0.359) (5.475) (5.769) 
Average Maternal Employment - child 1 to 5 0.318 -0.839 0.312 -0.934 
 
(0.112) (0.689) (0.110) (0.443) 
Average Maternal Employment - child 1 to 5 
* Father's Income 
 
0.111 
 
0.119* 
  
(0.0614) 
 
(0.0400) 
Average Paternal Employment - child 1 to 5 
* Mother's Income 
  
0.666 0.720 
   
(0.635) (0.658) 
Cohort 1965-69 0.328*** 0.331*** 0.326*** 0.330*** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0190) (0.0202) (0.0185) 
Cohort 1970-74 0.366*** 0.372*** 0.361*** 0.366*** 
 
(0.0214) (0.0195) (0.0160) (0.0146) 
     Observations 343 343 343 343 
R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.075 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 The only significant interaction effect in this model is on maternal employment when the 
daughter was 1 to 5 interacted with father’s income, compared to Figure 5 when both interaction 
                                                        
2 The first to cohorts from 1950 to 1959 are dropped because there were no mothers 
working when their daughter was 1 to 5 in that time period. 
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effects were positive and significant.  The magnitudes change somewhat and all significance 
drops from the father’s income coefficient.  All parental employment average direct effects are 
consistently negative, which means that this specification for parental employment should 
capture less income effects. This model does not change the signs or interpretation of interaction 
terms so I attribute the changes in significance due to collinearity.   
 
V.iii. Trends in Intergenerational Income Elasticity 
 The research on trends in intergenerational transmission of income status is less 
established than research on simple IIE. Previous literature does not reach a clear consensus on 
changes in elasticity over the 20
th
 century, and the divergent methods of estimation contribute to 
this.  Mayer and Lopoo (2005) use the PSID to calculate IIE for the son birth cohorts between 
1949 and 1965, however they only use one year of income data (when the son was 30 years old) 
to approximate son’s long run family income.  This ignores all other years of income data and 
their results show a large insignificant downward trend in IIE.  Mayer and Lopoo (2004) in a 
trend study for daughters estimate an insignificant but positive trend in IIE for the same cohorts.  
Corcoran (2001), on the other hand, finds that there has been an increase in family IIE for sons 
whose incomes were observed between the ages of 25 and 27.  Levine and Mazumder (2002), 
like Mayer and Lopoo, find a large but statistically insignificant decline in IIE.  Most of these 
studies focus on family incomes and use limited years of son’s income data.  My concern is that 
since most of these studies focus on family income correlation, the growth or decline in income 
mobility change if women’s income is an increasingly large portion of family income.   One 
possibility is if a son’s wife earns a larger portion of family income than his mother’s portion in 
his birth family, then the correlation between father-income could be constant but the mobility 
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could be observed to be increasing.  Fertig (2003) notes this and examines mobility between all 
distinct parent-child pairs using individual income, as I do.  She constructs cohorts of children 
with a wide variety of ages in each, maintaining a constant mean age.  She finds that the income 
elasticities fell for father-child pairs but remained constant across cohorts for mother-child pairs.   
 Hertz (2007) and Lee and Solon (2009) both use approximately the same cohort of 
children that I do but experiment by using all years of income data available for sons.  Lee and 
Solon (2009) aim to use all available years of income data when children are above 25 in age in 
order to maximize available data and include specific controls for child’s age variation.  They 
also use family income rather than individual income and find that there is no significant change 
in IIE in the United States over the cohorts born in 1952 to 1975.  Since they utilize all income 
over ages ranging from 25 to 48, their income elasticities gain precision over time as more birth 
cohorts join the sample.  Since IIE estimates are lower when son’s incomes are measured earlier 
in life, the earlier years of measuring IIE were biased to include only younger sons’ incomes 
while later years included IIE for all income-generating ages.  Hertz (2007) tests his method of 
using individual fixed effects against that of Lee and Solon (2009) and finds the same result, that 
there are no significant trends in IIE in this cohort. 
 In order to account for maternal income correlation with children separate from family 
income, I fit a linear trend by interacting the cohort indicator with the long run income of parents 
as in Fertig (2003) and Mayer and Lopoo (2005).  This is reflected in equation (6).  In Hertz 
(2007), Fertig (2003), and Lee and Solon (2009), there are strict age controls to control for the 
larger number of years of income they use to maximize data use.  In Fertig (2003), although the 
median age is preserved for each year cohort, the incomes for fathers are taken at an age range of 
23 to 68 for fathers and 21 to 40 for sons.  Fertig’s age controls of age and age squared for parent 
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and child while estimating IIE are not enough to accurately proxy for lifetime income because of 
heterogeneity across individuals in income growth rates over lifecycles.  According to Lee and 
Solon (2009), controls for interaction of child’s age with parental income is necessary to 
minimize the measurement error between current income and lifetime income. Lee and Solon 
(2009) use elaborate age controls that make it difficult to see the underlying patterns in the data 
driving their results.  Their IIE estimates for the first several years using younger birth cohorts’ 
income are far less precise than later estimates, which does not rule out sampling error.  Their 
results are significant for increasing elasticity for daughters whose incomes were measured from 
1977 to 1983 however the authors do not conclude this because these earlier years again rely 
heavily on extrapolating IIE at younger ages to IIE at more stable income-generating ages. 
Hertz (2007) objects the allowance for different effects of parental income at each age 
(Lee and Solon (2009) interaction effects), instead opting for individual fixed effects to allow for 
different age-income profiles.  He also chooses to interact age with other variables such as 
education and race to capture predictors of the shape of age-income profiles, though he does not 
include these predictors individually in the regression.  This method does not constrain the age-
income profile to be the same across cohorts.  He also does not find any significant trends in IIE 
over the birth cohorts from 1952 to 1975.   
I choose to account for children’s income transmission from mothers separately from that 
of fathers, and also differ in the proxy variable measurement of child’s permanent lifetime 
income.  Thus, I do not use all available years of income data for each child and complicate 
interpretation by including age controls, fixed effects, or other determinants of child’s income 
since I fix the ages at which I take income data.  At the same time, I do not bias all estimates of 
IIE downward by using a single year of income data for offspring as in Mayer and Lopoo (2005) 
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or Harding et al (2005).  Instead I use the five-year income averages for offspring, which 
maintains a constant age measurement across cohorts and eliminates the necessity for extensive 
age controls.  Because I use the same age for income measurements across cohorts, I am 
assuming the lifetime income distribution has remained fairly constant over the birth cohorts 
from 1950 to 1974.  Then, I interact the cohort indicator with father’s income to capture the 
differences in IIE as the cohort indicator increases.  These simplifications might not be as precise 
about trends of IIE as Lee and Solon (2009) and Hertz (2007) but they do allow the inclusion of 
maternal income and parental employment variables without reconsideration of controls.  Figures 
7 and 8 show equation (6) for sons and daughters IIE with paternal income. 
Figure 7.  Trend for Sons 
    (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
        
Father's Income 0.717*** 0.714*** 
 
(0.0660) (0.0606) 
Mother's Income 
 
0.0229 
  
(0.0335) 
Average Paternal Employment  
(APE) 
 
0.239 
  
(0.499) 
Average Maternal Employment 
(AME) 
 
0.0197 
  
(0.103) 
Cohort Indicator 0.979*** 1.003*** 
 
(0.202) (0.212) 
Father's Income * Cohort Indicator -0.0902*** -0.0929** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0203) 
   Observations 474 474 
R-squared 0.082 0.085 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results show a significant downward trend in IIE between fathers and sons based on 
the negative interaction between cohort indicator and paternal income, which is robust after 
including variables from the expanded model I introduce in column (2).  This follows from 
insignificant results on parental employment variables in Figure 2.  Mayer and Lopoo (2005) use 
the most similar model to mine however the reason why I find significance is most likely due to 
the income average I use for son’s income.  Daughter’s IIE trend is positive but not significant, 
which does not align with Lee and Solon (2009) that describe a significant trend.  Either way, the 
trend is not well-established. 
Next, I test the significance of changes in intergenerational income elasticity by cohort.  
Figure 9 displays results from equation (6), which involves interacting each five-year cohort 
dummy with father’s income.  Columns 1 and 2 depict results for son’s IIE and columns 3 and 4 
Figure 8. Trend for Daughters 
    (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
        
Father's Income 0.00230 -0.0356 
 
(0.225) (0.214) 
Mother's Income 
 
-0.0454 
  
(0.0370) 
Average Paternal Employment  
(APE) 
 
-1.007*** 
  
(0.105) 
Average Maternal Employment 
(AME) 
 
0.578** 
  
(0.143) 
Cohort Indicator -0.580 -0.803 
 
(0.515) (0.501) 
Father's Income * Cohort Indicator 0.0676 0.0888 
 
(0.0463) (0.0445) 
   Observations 464 464 
R-squared 0.053 0.079 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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report daughter’s IIE mobility.  The first birth cohort of children born from 1950-54 is dropped 
due to lack of observations.  All cohorts are compared to the last cohort of children born from 
1970 to 1974. 
Figure 9.  Cohort Interactions with Father's Income 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Son's 
Income 
Son's 
Income 
Daughter's 
Income 
Daughter's 
Income 
          
Father's Income 0.234** 0.223* 0.346*** 0.424*** 
 
(0.116) (0.120) (0.133) (0.127) 
Mother's Income 
 
0.0265 
 
-0.0574 
  
(0.0385) 
 
(0.0401) 
Average Paternal Employment  (APE) 
 
0.185 
 
-1.070*** 
  
(0.466) 
 
(0.406) 
Average Maternal Employment 
(AME) 
 
0.0325 
 
0.650*** 
  
(0.129) 
 
(0.222) 
Cohort 1955-59 -2.835 -2.789 2.666 3.362** 
 
(2.919) (2.889) (1.754) (1.705) 
Cohort 1960-64 -2.122 -2.149 -2.585 -1.993 
 
(1.872) (1.862) (2.196) (2.135) 
Cohort 1965-69 -1.798 -1.819 1.886 2.198 
 
(2.903) (2.954) (1.759) (1.687) 
Father's Income * Cohort 1955-59 0.256 0.254 -0.276 -0.342** 
 
(0.277) (0.275) (0.172) (0.168) 
Father's Income * Cohort 1960-64 0.198 0.202 0.211 0.153 
 
(0.178) (0.178) (0.210) (0.205) 
Father's Income * Cohort 1965-69 0.162 0.164 -0.185 -0.215 
 
(0.275) (0.279) (0.167) (0.160) 
     Observations 472 472 460 460 
R-squared 0.084 0.087 0.075 0.106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 For father-son IIE, there are no significant cohorts when the elasticity changed even after 
maternal income and parental employment averages are included in column (2).  Magnitudes for 
the interaction coefficients between father’s income and birth cohort are all positive.  The father-
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daughter income elasticity relationship, after controlling for maternal income and the parental 
employment averages, increases significantly from the cohort born in 1955-59 to the last cohort 
born from 1970-74.  This tentative result of increasing father-daughter IIE is also found in Lee 
and Solon (2009). 
In Figure 10, I create two graphs showing the trend in IIE for sons and daughters.  The 
first graph plots intergenerational income elasticities for father-son with and without the 
additional controls of maternal income and parental employment averages for each five-year 
birth cohort from 1955 to 1974.
3
  The second does the same for father-daughter pairs.   
Figure 10. 
 
                                                        
3
 First birth cohort from 1950-54 is dropped because of lack of observations to make an accurate 
estimate. 
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The above graphs show in detail the results from the trend regressions above.  The 
significant increase from 1955-59 cohort father-daughter IIE from Figure 9 column (4) is 
primarily from the extremely low value of IIE in the 1955-59 birth cohort. I am reluctant to 
conclude that the elasticity for daughters has truly increased in this time period, however, due to 
the small sample size and the obvious volatility that accompanies it.  On the other hand, the 
decrease in IIE for father-son pairs in Figure 7 is consistent with the falling trend in Figure 10.  
Figure 11 also shows the trend in intergenerational income elasticity for father-son and father-
daughter pairs by calculating the IIE for each overlapping five-year cohort (1955-1959, 1956-
1970, and so on) to track smaller movements in IIE estimates. This results in large fluctuations 
but may explain some of the previous trend results in Figures 7-9. 
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Figure 11.
 
 
 When dividing the cohorts into 16 overlapping cohorts as in Figure 11, the volatility in 
father-son IIE is revealed.  If I had defined the five-year cohorts differently, then the linear trend 
of intergenerational income mobility for father-son would not be increasing. When I redefine 
five-year cohorts to start in 1953, for example, the interaction variable of father’s income and 
cohort indicator as seen in Figure 6 becomes insignificant.  I also use birth year in place of 
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cohort indicator and cluster standard errors by birth year, as in Mayer and Lopoo (2005).  This 
also results in an insignificant trend. 
Thus, I conclude that there has been no significant change in intergenerational income 
mobility for sons or daughters over the 1950-1974 birth cohorts (or the 1980-2009 time period). 
 
VI.  Discussion of Results and Possible Errors 
 The results detail a measure of intergenerational income transmission that does not 
depend solely on paternal income and disregard maternal contributions.  By including both 
maternal income as well as considering the role of parental time investment in creation of IIE, 
the results are more difficult to interpret.  The aim was to select variables to include that would 
preserve pure intergenerational income elasticity between parent-child pairs, however due to the 
nature of including parental employment averages, estimating pure IIE may be compromised.  In 
this study, parental employment averages are intended to be a proxy for time spent at home 
interacting with children as an alternative to using the more precise time-use component of the 
PSID.  This is due to severe data limitations as well as the need to control for many variables 
correlated with time spent at work, including education, type of job, etc.  Because I wanted to 
preserve a traditional measure of IIE as much as possible, I decided to use the more general 
parental employment average, although this measurement is definitely not ideal as it is highly 
correlated with the lifetime income of parents.  With these considerations, my interpretations are 
not intended to be exact but rather highlight important issues in measuring intergenerational 
income elasticity. 
 In the section below, I discuss other problems commonly associated with the PSID and 
variable definitions along with their potential impact on my results. 
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VI.i. PSID Sample Attrition and Data Collection 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics has suffered about 50 percent sample loss since 
1968, which potentially creates attrition bias.  Most IIE literature using the PSID cites Fitzgerald, 
Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998a, 1998b) to discuss how attrition might bias results.  They report 
that for the original sample members, attrition bias remains quite low due to random attrition and 
the fact that transitory components causing sample attrition fade away by regression-to-the-mean 
effects.  There is more attrition of 1968 households with less advantaged backgrounds.  
Additionally, for the effects of attrition on intergenerational studies, the authors examine the 
impact on mean characteristics of the second generation along with estimates for 
intergenerational correlation in education or earnings.  Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 
(1998b) find that the father-son intergenerational coefficient is larger for the sample that does not 
leave the PSID but the difference is insignificant.  Thus the effects of sample attrition should not 
influence my results significantly. 
 The PSID has also undergone several changes to its data collection structure since the 
original 1968 sample.  The maximum reportable income was raised from $99,999 to $999,999 in 
1980 and then raised again in 1981 to its current maximum of $9,999,999.  The standard 
deviation for incomes increases for all individuals in those years.  As I choose to use offspring 
incomes when they were 30 to 35, only the first cohort born in 1950 to 1954 would have up to 
two years of incomes with low top codes.  However, since parents were recorded at age 30 to 35 
as well and the youngest children in my sample were born in 1979 with parents having an 
average child-bearing age of 29 and 27 for fathers and mothers respectively, most parents’ 
incomes were recorded before 1980.  This predetermines a smaller income range for the parents’ 
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incomes for most of the sample, implying that IIE estimates are artificially smaller for most of 
the earlier cohorts. 
The PSID has also changed to a biennual survey since 1997 due to resource constraints.  
Since children’s incomes are recorded until 2007 at the latest, the cohorts born in 1960-64 until 
1970-74 have less income information to average for an accurate long run income proxy.  The 
direction of this bias is unknown, however considering I chose to use the period when children 
were 30 to 35 years of age to measure income, the data recorded should approximate a stable 
period of income. 
 
VI.ii. Variable Definitions 
 The inconsistencies across intergenerational income elasticity and mobility literature 
stem from the differences in measuring incomes and methodology concerns.  One common 
practice in IIE literature that I also use in this paper is to drop all years of zero incomes.  This is 
standard in order to provide a more accurate measure of permanent income.  The inclusion of 
zero incomes often drops income correlations drastically (Couch and Lillard, 1998).  This does 
raise the question of who would have zero income years and whether this status is inherited.  I 
account for this somewhat in the parental employment averages variables that are a percentage of 
years of employment.  For the purposes of this discussion, I repeat my regressions with zero 
incomes included in the income averages to examine whether intergenerational income 
elasticities change using my methodology.  All estimates for father-child IIE fall but by less than 
0.10, which is far less drastic than in Couch and Lillard (1998).  This is probably due to the 
averaging of several years of income rather than relying on one year. 
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 My other variables of interest, average parental employment, are not included in any of 
the IIE literature so far.  This is probably because of wariness against including any variables 
that compromise pure intergenerational income elasticity.  In this study, although the interaction 
effects between parental time invested in children and parental income is not very clear, there is 
an indication that daughters’ incomes are more highly correlated with the parent that spends 
more time with them.  Daughters also have interesting direct effects from parental employment 
averages.  It would be valuable to create a variable that explicitly captures a parent’s time spent 
with child or childcare concentration but is not extremely correlated with income.  This would 
mitigate the need to parse out the income benefits on child from employment average effects on 
child. 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusion  
 The goal of this paper is to understand changes in intergenerational income transmission 
due to maternal employment and therefore changes in time spent with children.  For sons, it 
seems that neither the income brought in from maternal employment nor the parental 
employment averages I construct to approximate time spent with children impact IIE between 
father and son.  The expanded model of IIE that I use in this paper estimates that for daughters, 
there is a ceteris paribus positive effect of maternal employment on daughter’s future income and 
negative effect of paternal employment.  Overall, however, when including the income benefits 
from employment, the daughter benefits from both working parents but more so from maternal 
employment. 
 Next I examined how maternal employment during childhood affected the 
intergenerational income transmission from father to child.  To balance this, I also interacted 
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paternal employment during childhood with mother’s income.  These interactions are based in 
the theory that there is a time component to the transmission of income-generating traits and 
behaviors and the increase in maternal employment over the past four decades may have changed 
the amount of time either parent interacted with their children.  I find that there are significant 
interaction effects for daughters that imply if one parent is working full time, the daughter will 
have a more positive intergenerational income correlation with the other parent.  This could be 
justified by the idea that the child will spend more time with the other parent.  Although there are 
limitations regarding the average parental employment variable that captures more income 
characteristics, the question of time affecting IIE should be explored further. 
 I also test the significance of trends in intergenerational income mobility over the birth 
cohorts from 1950 to 1974.  Although there is a significant negative slope for father-son IIE and 
positive slope for father-daughter IIE, the results were not robust when making small 
modifications to the variables.  I conclude that there are no significant trends in father-son and 
father-daughter intergenerational income mobility over this period.   
 This study supports many claims that the intergenerational income elasticity model needs 
to be reevaluated in order to consolidate methodologies as well as consider the role of women.  
Further research should be conducted to examine whether income-generating daughters have 
distinctive effects based on parental time spent with them.  Economic mobility needs to be better 
measured and understood as without a clear picture, there are difficulties creating policy 
targeting societal socioeconomic problems. 
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